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1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM  
The level of security of a country is one of the major factors that will enable or disable it focus 
on improving its economy.  
The incidences of violence and insecurity in the country, and the government’s inaction or lack 
of response1 has led members of the public to question the central government’s ability to 
effectively perform its primary duty of protecting and providing the constitutional freedoms, 
which mainly include; the right to life and the right to security of persons.2 
Issues of crime and insecurity are viewed as major challenges in the country, in both urban and 
rural areas. Some of the most dreadful of these incidences experienced in the country which 
have claimed many lives include:  
1. The post-election crisis which immersed the country in a crisis in 2008 vividly showed 
the severe weaknesses of the Kenya Security sector whose image was badly tainted by 
the actions of some of its members. According to the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Post-election Violence (CIPEV), the security sector lacked the level of expertise 
required during the crisis.3 While some members of the force allowed themselves to be 
actively used for divisive political purposes4, others assisted citizens in distress based 
                                                          
1 There has been a breakdown of communication and cooperation between the senior national security officers 
and the county commissioners, appointed by the President, especially in sharing local intelligence information. 
This poor relations between the organs is detrimental to the security of the country as witnessed by the rampant 
insecurity: International Crisis Group Africa Briefing, ‘Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security’, 
November 2015, 5-6.    
2 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror’, September 2015: 
UNDP, ‘Are We Under Siege? The State of Security in Kenya’, 2014; Article 26 and 29, Constitution of Kenya, 
2010.  
3 ‘Kriegler and Waki Reports’, Revised Edition, 2009, 54.  
4 ‘The administrative authorities: the police, the security forces & the provincial administration take responsibility 
for various omissions and commissions such as failing to act with discipline and impartiality and sometimes 




on their political affiliations and ethnic identity.5 Also, others were involved in criminal 
acts and committed murder, rape, arson, theft and all sorts of other crimes.6 
 
2. The Westgate Mall Attack. On September 21, 2013, gunmen, who were suspected to 
be members of the Somali militant group, Al-Shabaab, attacked the Westgate Mall in 
Nairobi. After a four-day standstill, Kenyan officials asserted that the site of the attack 
was secured by armed forces. The attack resulted in hundreds of casualties and deaths.7 
The response of the government was viewed as poor. There was a Commission of 
Inquiry report which outlined some of the security gaps8 experienced during the attack. 
There was also a poor security force response that saw officers from different agencies 
shooting at each other during the terrorist attack.9 
3. The Garissa University Attack.10 In 2014, gunmen raided the Garissa University and 
injured and killed more than one hundred people within the institution. Al-Shabaab later 
claimed responsibility for the attack and claimed that it was in response to the 
deployment of Kenyan troops in Somalia.11 The government has admitted that there 
were gaps in the security response during the attack.12  
4. The Turkana – East Pokot Border Attack, that happened in 2015 where at least 46 
people were killed after those believed to be outlaws attacked and stole unknown sums 
                                                          
5 ‘The administrative authorities take responsibility in regard to the violence for failure to respond adequately and 
appropriately to the violence, thereby aggravating the suffering of the victims.’ Kriegler and Waki Reports, 54.  
6 International Centre for Transitional Justice, ‘Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice in Kenya’, 2010, 
3.  
7 ‘National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’, START Background Report, 
2013, 1.  
8 Corrupt Kenyan police and border guards assisted terrorists to access the country from Somalia; Kenyan 
authorities received intelligence which pointed to the fact that there was an impeding attack on one of the malls 
in Nairobi, at least twice, in the months leading up to September 2013 – Report of the Joint Committee on 
Administration and National Security; and Defence and Foreign Relations on the Inquiry into the Westgate 
Terrorist Attack and Other Terror Attacks in Mandera in North Eastern and Kilifi in the Coastal Region, 2013, 7.  
9 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2015: Events of 2014’, 2015, 334.  
10 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, “The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror”, 2015; Security 
Research and Information Centre, Kenya, 2015.  
11 Bellal A, ‘The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014’, 2015, 236 – 237.    
12 There was lack of action by security agencies and the university management to act on the prior warning of the 




of cattle. Currently, no official reports have been made on the attack. However, in a 
media report, the Baringo County Commissioner, Mr. Okwanyo, stated that there needs 
to be a security team in Turkana East to deal with this issue of banditry because of the 
tension. Also, one of the reasons why there may be poor response by government 
security bodies is because of the remoteness of the area,13 which leads those living 
around that area to believe that the area may need a local security body to guarantee 
their safety.  
 
This dissertation explores whether complete devolution of security functions is possible 
and if it is one of the practical ways in which the problem of insecurity can be dealt with.  
 
Devolution in the Constitution of Kenya is presented as ‘a system of multilevel government 
under which two distinct and interdependent levels of government – the national and county 
– are required to conduct their mutual relations in a consultative and cooperative manner.’14 
The objects of devolution set out in Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya can be broadly 
grouped into: those that promote and advance democracy and accountability; development 
and service delivery; equity and inclusiveness and those limiting centralisation.15  
 
Devolution of security functions refers to a system whereby the national government in a 
country transfers the internal security responsibility, for specified functions, to organs that 
are largely outside the direct control of the central government.16 The Constitution under 
the Fourth Schedule, which deals with the division of functions between the national and 
county governments, specifies security functions as exclusive to the national government, 
with most of the mandates placed under the Inspector General of Police.17 The security 
services include: the national defence and the use of national defence services, police 
services, including the setting of standards of recruitment, training of police and use of 
                                                          
13 Human Rights Watch, ‘There Is No Time Left’, Climate Change, Environmental Threats, and Human Rights 
in Turkana County, Kenya, 2015.  
14 Kangu J, ‘Constitutional Law of Kenya on Devolution’, Strathmore University Press, Nairobi, 2015, 10.  
15 Article 174, Constitution of Kenya (2010); Kangu J, ‘Constitutional Law of Kenya on Devolution’, 111.  
16 Crook R & Manor J, ‘Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa’, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1998, 81; Reynolds A, ‘The Architecture of Democracy – Constitutional Design, Conflict 
Management and Democracy’, Oxford University Press, United States, 2002, 209.  




police services, criminal law and correctional services. However, not all of these security 
functions mentioned above are under the mandate of the Inspector General of Police.  
 
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Determining whether it is practical to devolve some specified security functions to counties, 
and if this move will deal with the problem of insecurity in Kenya with such that the 
government will be performing its primary function of protecting the Kenyan citizens. 
 
1.2 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Security is a function of the national government but because of its dominated 
discussion since the introduction of devolution, after the inauguration of the 2010 
Constitution, it cannot be ignored. The overriding argument is that, although it is a function 
of the national government, can some functions of internal security be devolved to the 
counties?   
The cases of insecurity discussed above and others which have not been mentioned, in 
the country, raise important questions about the structure of the country’s security sector. 
The continued failure by the national government to contain some of these challenges 
supports the argument to have county governments involved in dealing with them. These 
cases have created a negative perception of incompetence and corruption on the part of the 
national government. 
Before the 2010 Constitution, Provincial Administration – running from the Office of 
the President to the Sub-Chief – was the frame of the Kenyan state. This changed with the 
2010 Constitution. However, the problem, it may seem, is that those framing the laws may 
not have come up with what can be called good alternatives because the security situation 
has deteriorated. When it comes to security, it is important that there be supervision of law 
enforcement agencies and that it goes through a democratic test.18  
Is it therefore possible and wise to devolve specified security functions in Kenya as one 
of the ways to deal with the problem of insecurity? 
 
 
                                                          
18 ‘Devolution is often seen as desirable for its economic efficiency, equity & responsiveness because the 






1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research aims to question whether the menace of insecurity in the country can be 
reduced or completely done away with through devolution of some internal security 
functions, such that they are dealt with by county governments. 
 
1.4 QUESTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
The following are the research questions:  
1) Due to the problem of insecurity in the country, is complete devolution of security 
functions, such that county governments can be engaged in the administration of security, 
one of the practical ways that can be employed to try and solve the problem? 
2) By considering arguments put forth against devolution of security functions, how 
prudent will it be to facilitate the inclusion of the county governments in the management 
of security?  
3) If complete devolution of security functions is unattainable, are there any other existing 




This study will use a qualitative approach to look at the Constitutional provisions which 
have expressly delineated functions between the national and county governments and look 
at whether there is a mechanism for the transfer of functions between both levels of 
government, that is, the national and county governments.   
Furthermore, the study will look at the desk research of  secondary information such as 
annual security reports made by other governments, whose security functions are devolved, 
so as to look at the state of insecurity in those countries. The study will also look at the 
works and assertions made by various scholars in the field.  
These methods will help frame and put into context the situation at hand and as such 





1.6 DEVOLUTION – LITERATURE REVIEW  
The original concept of devolution was put forward by Edmund Burke, in the 18th 
century. He used the idea of devolution to offer a solution to the challenges faced by the 
British government by the American colonialists and the Irish Catholics who were excluded 
by the 1801 Act of Union.19 He based his argument on the fact that, the Westminster 
Parliament had two major functions – to act as the legislature for the United Kingdom and 
to be the imperial power for all British colonies. Therefore, these two functions were 
separated such that the British colonies could have their own local legislatures while at the 
same time, still owe allegiance to the imperial power in London.20 
Aughey A., states that the central idea behind devolution is to find a central ground 
between separation of powers on one hand and over-centralisation of resources and power 
under the government on the other.21 This central idea discussed is what can be said to have 
been used to come up with the working definition of devolution which means, ‘the transfer 
of powers from a superior to an inferior political authority’.22 
Bogdanor, identifies three major forms of devolution, as found in other jurisdictions. 
The Welsh, practises executive devolution. This means that the power to make decisions is 
devolved. The Scottish Parliament practises legislative devolution. This means that the 
power to make laws is devolved. Another form of devolution is administrative devolution. 
This means that the power to carry out specific functions is what is devolved. This form of 
devolution was practised by the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Ireland areas.23 At the 
moment, it may seem that Kenya practises the administrative form of devolution in the 
security sector. This is because, the power to enact laws dealing with security matters has 
still been left to the national government while other bodies, within the sector, carry out 
their legal mandated functions.  
Mutakha Kangu states that the Kenyan Constitution presents devolution as a system of 
multi-level government under which the Constitution creates two distinct and 
interdependent levels of government – the national and county – that are required to conduct 
                                                          
19 Pilkington C, ‘Devolution in Britain Today’, 2002, 9.  
20 Pilkington C, ‘Devolution in Britain Today’, 9-10.  
21 Aughey A, ‘Nationalism, Devolution & the Challenge to the United Kingdom State’, 2009, 11.  
22 Pilkington C, ‘Devolution in Britain Today’, 8.  




their mutual relations in a consultative and cooperative manner.24 The central ideas behind 
devolution as set out in Article 174 of the Constitution can be broadly grouped into: those 
promoting and advancing democracy and accountability; development and service 
delivery; equity and inclusiveness; and those limiting centralisation.25  
The upholder of national security in a devolved government is also something that 
needs to be addressed. In the UK, for example, since there is devolution from higher level 
governments to local bodies, especially, local urban bodies, the local governments are the 
ones recognized as the immediate custodians of citizen’s welfare.26 However, with the 
current phrasing of the Constitution27, it may be impossible to leave this function primarily 
on the local governments. This means that the Constitution may have to be amended so as 
to actually state who the custodian of national security will be if devolution is considered.  
Another area of focus would be to look at the rationale for having policing functions 
under either the central government or the county or provincial government. Kornicki states 
that, historically, the idea behind having police control under the central government was 
because of the fact that there was widespread anti-government activism. This rationale was 
developed during the colonial era. Rather than to merely serve the residents, the police were 
also expected to protect territories from invasion from colonial powers. In keeping in line 
with this view, police functions in all major European capitals, for example Paris, were 
under the jurisdiction of the central government.28 
According to the Central Bureau of Investigation, separate policing organisations were 
set up because the organ established by the state was unable to efficiently carry out its 
functions. At an early stage of the World War II, the government of India was experiencing 
large scale corruption even with policing functions under the central government. Since the 
police and other law enforcement agencies set up by the state were unable to combat the 
prevailing corruption, a separate organisation was set up to deal with the problem. 
                                                          
24 Kangu J, ‘Constitutional Law of Kenya on Devolution’, Strathmore University Press, Nairobi, 2015, 10.  
25 Kangu, ‘Constitutional Law of Kenya on Devolution’, 111.  
26 A Nirmaj, ‘Formation of a Grants Policy for Local Bodies’, 1981, 12.  
27 Fourth Schedule, Constitution of Kenya, 2010 which clearly states national security shall be a function of the 
national government.  
28 Kornicki P, ‘Meiji Japan: The Emergence of the Meiji State’, 1998, 113; Murray T & Beare M, ‘Police and 




Therefore, the setting up of a separate body to deal with corruption was seen as an urgent 
necessity.29 
Therefore, with this foundation in mind, where do we go from here? The research will 
seek to answer whether the current legislation we have on devolution is sufficient enough 
such that we are also able to include devolution of security functions. However, with the 
background that there are various forms of devolution, it may be necessary to consider 
having complete versus partial devolution – having in mind the sensitive nature of the 
security sector. 
 
1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Devolution of political power, responsibilities and resources is originally believed to 
have arisen from social facts. Due to this, the social contract theory is one that describes 
the relationship in society between laws and people, and why the members of the general 
public needs them for existence.30  
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1689) proposed that, a society not governed by rules and laws 
would be an unruly one and full of tragic events. He explains that, it would be a Darwinian 
situation such that only the strong would be able to survive and the weak would perish 
because of the inability to provide for themselves. Hobbes believed that such a society 
would turn out to be a “dog-eat-dog” place because people would do whatever it took just 
so that they can survive, at the same time, ensuring that they are not attacked for another 
man’s survival.31 
For Hobbes, therefore, the solution to this problem was to have a social contract 
between the government and the members of the society. The social contract meant that, 
everyone in society came into some sort of cooperative understanding, which is what is 
considered to be the ‘social contract’. In that way, everyone’s interest would be to enforce 
rules that provide safety and security for all even the weakest. The social contract, once 
enforced, would be able to transform a society from a “state of nature” into one that would 
flourish. The degree to which the social contract and provision of security would protect 
                                                          
29 Central Bureau of Investigations, ‘Central Police Organisations’, 2005, 223.  
30 McCartney S & Parent R, ‘Ethics in Law Enforcement’, Victoria BC Campus, 2015, Chapter 2.  




the weak would depend on various other factors, but it would be agreed upon all that there 
is a need to contract so as to ensure security for all.32 
Other major proponents of the theory include Jean Jacque Rousseau and John Locke. 
Both of them talk about the state, government and individuals. Locke and Rousseau state 
that there is a social contract between the government and the state such that the state exists 
to preserve and protect the natural rights of citizens. The two proponents believe that when 
the government fails in its primary role of protecting citizens, then the individuals in the 
state have a right and sometimes this right can even be considered an obligation, to rebel 
against the state.33 
In most societies, there is what can be called a ‘social contract’ between citizens and 
the government. One of the main functions of any government in any jurisdiction is to 
protect the civil liberties of citizens. Some fundamental natural rights are: the right to life, 
liberty and property.34 Protection of these fundamental rights relates to the issue of 
insecurity. The citizens expect the state to, keep them safe and secure.35 However, there are 
many citizen grievances in the current Kenyan situation, as indicated above, stating that the 
government has at times, failed to act, while in some instances, it has, but the actions it 
takes are unsatisfactory. Therefore, it may seem that it is the duty and also the right of 
citizens to demand that actions be taken against the state so that rules can be enforced to 
protect the weak, in this case, the citizens in general, to prevent them from perishing due to 
insecurity in the country. Rousseau and Locke both propose that the individuals in a state 
have a right to rebel when the government breaches the social contract. Thus, by testing 
devolution of security functions in the country, this research may be seen as one of the 






                                                          
32 Elahi M, ‘Social Contract Theory by Hobbes, Locke & Rousseau’, Academia, 2016, 4.  
33 Elahi M, ‘Social Contract Theory by Hobbes, Locke & Rousseau’, 5; Cassesse M & Vohrah L C, ‘Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man’, 2003, 184-185.  
34 Constitution Society, ‘The Social Contract and Constitutional Republics’, 2007.  





1) Limited Access to Information: 
Since the study will rely mainly on secondary information, some of these resources may be 
unavailable or difficult to access.  
 
2) Limited Time:  
The research is to be covered and submitted within a certain time limit as it is part of the course 
work of the Bachelor of Laws degree.  
 
3) Costs of Research Resources:  
Other than some resources being unavailable, some may be available but costly to acquire. For 
example, the cost of buying books which are only available on hard copy.  
 
1.9 CONCLUSION  
The research will therefore try to look at whether devolution of security functions in Kenya is 
attainable and efficient with consideration to the current situation in the country and whether it 






2.0 THE GOVERNANCE LEVELS AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE POLICE FORCE 
2.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
In assessing the possibility and advantage of devolving security as a solution to insecurity, this 
chapter will focuses on the previous governance levels and institutions in the police force and 
look at the current Kenyan situation. Chapter 3 of this dissertation will then give a broader 
discussion on the sufficiency of devolution in further detail.  
In East Africa, the police force organ officially began in the year 1896, a year after Kenya was 
declared a Protectorate. The British Foreign Office declared that the first police station in 
Kenya be opened in the city of Mombasa. During this period, the term that was commonly used 
to refer to soldiers was “Askari”, which is currently still the term used to refer to them. The 
soldiers were troops from East Africa and the Middle East who served in the European armies. 
The first policemen to be recruited were used to safeguard shops, storehouses and banks – most 
of which was European property. The era of the colonial rule saw indigenous people being 
recruited by various colonial powers as soldiers. Some of these colonial powers included, the 
Italian, British, Portuguese, Belgian and German. These soldiers participated in assisting the 
European forces to acquire the colonial territories which were finally put under their rule and 
they later functioned as the major defence force within the territory. Also, they participated in 
the 1st and 2nd World Wars.36  
The British Imperial Company had an administration bloc which protected various interests 
such as trading routes, business centres, staff etc. Also, it appealed to other bloc’s such as the 
East African Rifles, the Uganda Rifles and the King’s African Rifles for help in protection of 
trade ventures.37 
In 1920, the modern Kenya Police was founded. However, Africans only occupied subordinate 
positions ranks and worked under the Europeans and Asians. In the urban areas, especially 
Nairobi, the police force was expected to maintain safety. This means, they were to prevent 
any potential crime from occurring and suppress any disorder which would arise from the 
                                                          
36 Sommer H M, ‘History of the Police in Kenya 1885-1960’, 2007, 2.  




Africans who were then living in “Eastlands”.38 During this year also, there was a review 
carried out within the organ and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was established. 
Also education classes were provided for those officers who served in the lower ranks – these 
included mainly the African soldiers. 39 
The police force was later expanded because of propositions in the report made by the Police 
Terms of Service Committee of 1946 which recommended that the force be expanded. Also, at 
this time the territory experienced many rebellions against the British, therefore, the imperial 
power felt the need to have more people serving in the force so as to contain the unrest from 
the Africans. Still, even with the expansion of the force and extension of skills to those in the 
subordinate ranks within the body, this did not have any effect on what was considered to be 
the main function of the force – that is, that it was to be an instrument of the colonial 
administration to suppress the Africans.40 
Between 1952 and 1960, the imperial power was in fear due to the increase of the rebellious 
groups with the most famous being the Mau Mau in the late 1940’s and begin of the 1950’s. 
The main areas of the group’s operation were the Rift Valley and Central areas of Kenya. Due 
to this, in October 1952 a state of emergency was declared. The army took power over from 
the police, which as seen from above, was at a lower level, in terms of enforcement agencies 
at the time. Various security forces worked during this period when the state of emergency was 
declared – some of which include: the Home Guards, the British military, volunteer military 
forces and the Kenya police force. A special police bureau, the ‘Special Effort Force’ was set 
up in 1953 mainly to deal with the Mau Mau movement. The Kenya Police Reserve and the 
CID were the most active departments in trying to supress this rebellion. Also, the number of 
those serving in the police force rose. In 1954 the Police force consisted of about 14,000 
policemen, in addition to the increase in manpower, about 200 Police Signals stations were set 
up, more British trained policemen were engaged, the vehicles were equipped with wireless 
communication to improve communication and several District Military Intelligence Officers 
were employed countrywide. The state of emergency ended in 1960. This Mau Mau revolt and 
the fear of any other rebellions was what made the British power to leave the colony in 1963 
                                                          
38 Ruteere & Pommerolle, ‘Democratizing Security or Decentralizing Repression? The Ambiguities of Community 
Policing in Kenya’, African Affairs Vol. 102, 2003, 587.  
39 Mulei, ‘Theories on the Role and Function of the Police’, University of Nairobi, 2008, 17. 




and hand over the country to those African politicians who had been leading the country in the 
struggle for independence. This lead to the acquisition of independence of Kenya that same 
year.41  
Following the independence of Kenya, the Constitution used at that time was based on the 
Westminster model. The various provisions in the Constitution envisioned the police force as 
a completely neutral and independent body. Also, the 1963 Constitution provided that the 
police force would be established by law and that the force would be regulated by a Police 
Service Commission and National Security Council. The Inspector General Police was to be 
appointed by the President on the guidance of the Police Service Commission. However, these 
provisions were never realized due to the lack of legal structures which would necessitate this 
change.42  
During the early 1990s, the uncertainty felt in the country due to the move towards a multi-
party democracy brought greater pressure for police reform in the country. There was a rising 
need to transform the police into a more modern service, with standards in line with 
international ideals of policing.43  This however, was not realized until 2002 after there was a 
change of government, with the National Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (NARC) 
winning the elections.  In 2003, the then government established the Task Force on Police 
Reforms, which was the first time such a far-reaching reform procedure specifically targeting 
the police had been started by the government. The task force was required to analyse the 
current policing activities in place and provide recommendations. The task force proposed a 
number of commendations including, but not limited to, encouraging the development of a 
public relations campaign and the employment of structural changes and institutional 
reorganization. The focus of the task force was, however, not on accountability and 
professionalism.44 
                                                          
41 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative & the Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘The Police, The People, 
The Politics: Police Accountability in Kenya’ 2006, 4-5; Sommer, ‘History of the Police in Kenya 1885-1960’, 
13-14.  
42 Ghai Y, Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, ‘The Constitution and the Economy’, Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2002, 62.  
43 The report made by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission established that the public perceived the 
behaviour of the police as corrupt and violent which was not in line with the United Nations standards of policing.   
44 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative & the Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘The Police, The People, 




The structure above outlines what was the National organization.  
On a provincial level, there was a Provincial Commissioner (PC) in charge of each of the 10 
Provinces. Under the PC was a unit command known as the Administration Police. Each 
province had its own body. After independence this system was retained by the new 
government. The reason was that it was a system which provided a link between the 
government and the people who were considered to be in the lower local level.45 
 
2.2 CURRENT STRUCTURE  
Currently, the Inspector General of Police is Joseph Kipchirchir Boinett. He is in charge of all 
policing and security functions in Kenya. This office was introduced so as to replace the office 
of the Police Commissioner. He is the second holder of the office after David Mwole Kimaiyo.  
The Kenya Police is divided into the following bodies:46  
1. The General Service Unit  
2. The Anti-Stock Theft Unit 
3. The Criminal Investigation Department 
4. The Traffic Police Department  
5. Kenya Police College  
6. Kenya Police Air Wing  
7. Kenya Railways Police  
8. Tourism Police Unit 
9. Kenya Police Dog Unit  
10. Kenya Airports Police Unit  
11. Diplomatic Police Unit 
12. Maritime Police Unit  
13. National Disaster Management Unit  
14. Presidential Escort Unit  
                                                          
45 Nguru S, Provincial Administration under the New Constitution, 2012, accessed at: 
http://www.ustawi.info.ke/index.php/government/government-under-the-new-constitution/provincial-
administration.  





The Police Act lays down the main functions of the police service as: maintenance of law and 
order; preservation of peace; protection of life and property; prevention and detection of crime; 
apprehension of offenders; and enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it has been 
charged.47 
Other than the Police Act, the police force is also guided by the National Police Service 
Standing Orders. These were put in place to guide the actions of the members of the force and 
ensure that they always observe the law when carrying out their functions. The Orders establish 
the formation of various units of the service, which have been mentioned above, and their range 
of work. Also, it stipulates the functions carried out by the Administration Police (AP) and 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The Standing Orders also show the national police 
organisational structure, working units and operational ones with clear guidelines on how 
officers should handle various situations. The Standing Orders are executive orders for the 
general control, direction and information of the service so as to unite police services under the 
command of the Inspector General (IG) of Police. It states that executive duties of those in the 
service shall be exercised at the instruction from the office of the Inspector General and 
delegated accordingly to the Kenya Police Service, the Administration Police Service and the 
Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI). Deputy Inspectors General will be in charge of 
AP and regular police services and the DCI. It also presents a framework of all the new police 
positions and their functions, police stations and outposts and what is supposed to be done in 
those places.48 
2.3 POLICE REFORMS   
The outcome of the 2007 post-election violence was one of the main factors that led to 
the push for the national police reform agenda. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-
Election Violence (CIPEV) linked the police to some of the heinous acts of violence and the 
killings that were experienced during the Post-Election Violence, as earlier mentioned in 
chapter one. The CIPEV and the UN special rapporteur report on extra judicial killings both 
made recommendations that the police force should go through far-reaching changes49 so as to 
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improve the general policing system in the country.50 Also, one of the agendum of the National 
Accord and Reconciliation Agenda listed was, ‘constitutional, legal and institutional’ reforms, 
one of which was law enforcement institutions, as a means to improve the protection of the 
rule of law while the members of the police force carry out their duties.51 In response to these 
recommendations, the National Taskforce on Police Reforms in 2009 headed by Retired Judge 
Philip Ransley was setup by the government. The taskforce came up with up to 200 
recommendations. To fast track and coordinate the implementation of the recommendations, 
the President established the Police Reform and Implementation Committee (PRIC).52 
Following the recommendations made in the Ransley report various recommendations were 
then implemented as provisions of law in the formulation of the 2010 Constitution. The 
promulgation of the 2010 Constitution introduced important changes in the policy, legislation 
and institutional structures towards police reform and significantly enhanced police 
accountability. Some key changes included: the establishment of the National Police Service 
(NPS), that combined the Kenya Police and the Administration Police under one command 
which was the newly created office of the Inspector General, that was previously held by the 
Police Commissioner; the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) whose duties are to  
develop training policies, advise on salaries and remuneration of the members of the Service, 
supervise recruitment and disciplinary issues and the selection of the members of the National 
Police Service, : and the introduction of a specific body required to address complaints brought 
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2.4 CONCLUSION  
In conclusion therefore, this chapter’s main focus was to give the history of development of 
the Kenyan police force until its current status. How centralization of security and policing 
functions has currently failed together with the disadvantages and advantages of having a 





CHAPTER THREE  
3.0 THE SUFFICIENCY OF DEVOLVING SECURITY 
FUNCTIONS 
 
After looking at the history of the police sector, this Chapter seeks to test the sufficiency of 
devolving security functions – and if this is a feasible solution in light of other considerations. 
In as much as the general police force may have failed to efficiently carry out its required 
duties, is complete devolution practical?  
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1 of this paper, the social contract theory is the theoretical 
principle that describes the relationship in society between laws and people, and why the 
general public needs them for peaceful existence. Hobbes, who is regarded as the main 
proponent of this theory states that, a society without rules and laws to govern our actions 
would be an undesirable place to exist in. He describes a society without rules as one living in 
a “state of nature.” In such a state, people would act with lack of concern to others. Life in a 
state of nature would be Darwinian, where the strongest survive and the weak perish. Such a 
society described by Hobbes, refers to one without the luxuries and requirements that are taken 
for granted in today’s society.54  
The solution to this problem according to Hobbes, is for those living in a society to come 
together and have a social contract which can protect everyone, especially those regarded as 
the weakest in society. Therefore, the government is expected to come up with standards or 
regulations which will ensure provision of security for all. At the same time, the people are 
expected to obey them. The duty of respect of citizens towards the state relies on the capability 
of the state to provide security to all.55  
According to Locke and Rousseau, the social contract mainly depends on the state’s important 
function of ensuring security and safety of the people. If the state is unable to fulfil this function 
then the people have the power to change those who have legislative power within a state.56 
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The proponents are therefore stating that the actions of opposition from the people, is a measure 
of protecting the uprightness of the state and the rule of law.  
 
3.1 RATIONALE BEHIND CENTRALIZATION OF SECURITY 
FUNCTIONS  
Centralization means that, powers are in the hands of one governing body in all parts of a state. 
This means that only one figure has authority within the state to carry out all functions by itself. 
Centralization of functions limits all administrative functions to those chosen as representatives 
of the central government without including other bodies.57  
In most jurisdictions, security functions are more likely to be centralized because, as seen 
earlier from the proponents of the social contract theory, the state is the one charged with the 
primary responsibility to ensure that law and order is upheld so that peace and security is 
guaranteed for all as the right to life and to security are considered as priceless rights of an 
individual under the Constitution.58 The state will carry out this function by having laws which 
commend punishment in instances where one violates these rights. The aim of this system is to 
act as measure of prevention of insecurity.  
At the same time, these functions assigned to the state should be achievable by them. The 
government should be equipped so as to effectively discharge these security functions. If the 
state lacks the ability and means to perform these functions then it is failing to carry out its 
main function and there is therefore no point in allocation it this responsibility.59 The general 
principle is that ‘resources must follow and match responsibilities’.60 
With the evidence presented in Chapter 1 of this paper, showing that the national security 
organs have been unable to control this problem of insecurity,61 it shows that the central 
government lacks the capacity, and possibly the machinery, to effectively deal with insecurity 
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in the country. This lack of capacity by the central government leads the argument which 
necessitates having some functions devolved so as to counter these heinous effects.  
 
3.2 FAILURE OF SECURITY ORGANS  
Article 1062 binds all bodies of the State and citizens to observe and respect the rule of law and 
Constitutionalism. This legal provision requires all state organs and state officials to apply the 
national values and principles when enacting laws and implementing decisions which would 
affect the public. This Article fits into the argument below as it shows the link between the 
decisions made by the police organs and whether the mandate was exercised with respect to 
the national values and principles. For example, delayed action of the security organs in various 
instances already outlined above in other Chapters shows lack of good governance in the 
security organs. Good governance is one of the national values and principles outlined in 
Article 10 of the Constitution.  
The Constitution expressly provides, under the Fourth Schedule, that security functions are an 
exclusive function of the national government, with the Inspector General of Police charged 
with the mandate of being incharge of some of them. The security services include: the national 
defence and the use of national defence services, police services, including the setting of 
standards of recruitment, training of police and use of police services, criminal law and 
correctional services. These bodies63 are to ensure that citizens are protected against any 
internal and external security threats. The exercise of this mandate by these bodies, which is 
important, will be regarded as ensuring that there is respect of human rights, human dignity 
and the rule of law. The previous failure of the security agencies to exercise this obligation has 
led to the security threats facing the country. They include terrorism, organized crime, ethnic 
violence, resource conflicts, and robbery with violence and street muggings.64 Some of these 
examples, like the Westgate Attack, have been exhaustively mentioned in the first chapter of 
this paper.  
The security gap - failure of the national security organs to battle crime and insecurity is 
considered as one of the main factors encouraging the rise of illegal gangs. The National Crime 
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Research centre in its report recognized 46 illegal criminal gangs operating within the 
country.65 
3.3 EFFICIENCIES OF DEVOLUTION  
Devolution of security functions may lead to national cohesion and integration. Security organs 
in their response to insecurity cases, for example, terrorism, have sidelined certain 
communities. Such actions from these bodies have led to instances of ethnic tensions. In some 
cases, members coming from these excluded communities have been ejected or reprisals were 
directed to them. Such actions do not support the spirit of national unity. Vision 2030 clearly 
demonstrates the interdependence and interconnectivity of the three pillars (economic, social 
and political). However, implementation of certain policies in addressing the insecurity events 
are mostly exclusive and discriminatory in nature.66 Such actions lead to the feelings of 
hostility.67 
 
Another advantage is that it may help to control the gangs and militias whose activities cause 
insecurity in the country. Youth unemployment is what influences most gang members to 
engage in crime and gang activities. Youth unemployment was listed as one of the causes 
leading to increased radicalization in Garissa and Mombasa counties.68 Radical and extremist 
groups recruiting the youth into religious and political movements, which can be considered 
illegal gangs, is the main insecurity issue in the country.  The national government and county 
governments can therefore work together to deal with this problem by encouraging the idle 
youth to be involved in community policing. A community policing initiative refers to a 
community-state partnership system in security such that most members of the youth are 
involved in the combating of security so as to reduce the crime rates. The authorities in a county 
are likely to have more local knowledge on what is working and they also enjoy greater local 
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legitimacy than the national government does in a particular area. Therefore, they are in a better 
position to recognize and make stronger local practices of community-police partnerships and 
other positive initiatives which eventually will have the effect of improving community safety 
and security. Furthermore, counties are less rigid and innovative in addressing security and 
conflict issues.69 Community policing is already currently in place, however, this function 
needs to be heightened. The County Police Authority is the organ that has the mandate of 
ensuring that public participation is enhanced through community policing activities.70 It 
somehow leads to devolution of the security functions because the national and county 
government work together – even if one is not charged with the duty of enacting laws, they are 
both charged with the duty of implementation.  
  
Devolution of security functions may also have the effect of improving the relationship 
between the police and the community. The public and the Government – through the county 
representatives - need to co-operate because criminals are part of the societies we live in and 
are known to the public, which should uncover them. Since devolution was intended to 
strengthen citizen participation in governance71, having security decentralized may help mend 
these relations.72   
 
Political influence and the lack of commitment from political leaders have led to the lack of 
commitment to peace and security as there remain impediments to peace which are often 
stronger than the incentives. Devolution of functions and resources has improved the amount 
of economic and political power. Due to this, the elected leaders will often want to ensure the 
victory of their own communities during conflict due to the political and financial gains that 
can be obtained.73 In as much as this may initially seem to be an advantage, this may eventually 
have the effect of creating gangs and militias working under these political leaders, thus, 
worsening the security situation. Therefore, this would only seem to be an advantage to a 
certain extent.  
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3.4 DEFICIENCIES OF DEVOLUTION  
Devolution may lead to inter-regional inequalities and therefore, widen intra-national poverty 
gaps and foster politically weakening forces. Since different regions are differently capable in 
various terms, such as, natural resources, level of economic activities, land values, etc. some 
areas may be able to generate more revenue than others and afford their citizens more or better 
quality services than is provided in other jurisdictions which lack the capacity. One of the main 
arguments advancing the centralization argument is the need for equitable distribution of 
available resources so as to avoid such inequalities. According to Mutakha Kangu, county 
governments have a role in the delivery of social justice which is the primary objective of 
devolution and is a measure to address systematic ethno-regional discrimination and 
inequality.74 Therefore, if other counties have a better ability to provide machinery to protect 
themselves as compared to others, there will be issues as to discrimination and marginalization. 
Decentralization can bring higher risks related to power as influence is given to local elites or 
special interest groups. If there are no precautions or laws in place, there may be the risk of 
having these groups of people taking for themselves resources initially conferred on the local 
people for their own benefit. It is therefore important that in formulating the policies guiding 
decentralization, the provisions should include measures to prevent the process from being 
“high-jacked” by any single group. An argument put forth by most people is that the Governors 
of the counties are rooting for devolution so as to have more power in their hands.75 This is 
within the Kenyan situation.  
To further the argument above, misuse of power could be encouraged by the lack of supervision 
or due to weak accountability mechanisms. This can happen if the central government 
supervision is done away with due to the new independent status of local governments, if 
devolution is introduced, but mechanisms for accountability are not put in place. 
Accountability measures should be put in place if greater autonomy is to be conferred on local 
governments. This could be in the form of legislation which ensures transparency and openness 
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in the conduct of local affairs, and new mechanisms for accountability, such as the 
authorization of civil society entities.76  
Issues of financial resources and the cost-effectiveness of devolution are also regarded as 
challenges. Economists have argued that centralization of powers are responsible for what is 
termed as economies of scale. This argument states that central delivery of most services is 
usually more effective, particularly in jurisdictions that are considered small states, because of 
likely savings arising from reduced overheads, bulk purchasing, and other areas of cost savings. 
To the extent that this argument is valid, it would show the disadvantage of decentralization of 
functions and resources.77 Therefore, it may seem that it would be more advantageous to have 
the central government purchase security apparatus and machinery than to entrust this function 
to the lower levels of government.  
 
3.5 LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEVOLUTION OF SECURITY 
FUNCTIONS  
As stated earlier, the Constitution expressly states that all security functions are an exclusive 
function of the national government. This mandate is placed under the Inspector General of 
Police. The security services include: the national defence and the use of national defence 
services, police services, including the setting of standards of recruitment, training of police 
and use of police services, criminal law and correctional services. This is provided for under 
the Fourth Schedule.  
Therefore, in light of the constitutional provisions, what are the legal implications if devolution 
is to be encouraged?  
First, the law would have to be introduced to the legislature to be amended so as to include the 
change. It would go through a legislative process, including the following steps: First Reading; 
Second Reading; Third Reading; Presidential Assent; then Commencement.78  
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However, the Constitution,79 provides that a referendum is to be carried out if an amendment 
relates to any of the following issues:  
(a) the supremacy of this Constitution;  
(b) the territory of Kenya; 
(c) the sovereignty of the people; 
(d) the national values and principles of governance referred to in Article 10 (2) (a) to (d); 
(e) the Bill of Rights; 
(f) the term of office of the President; 
(g) the independence of the Judiciary and the commissions and independent offices to which 
Chapter Fifteen applies; 
(h) the functions of Parliament; 
(i) the objects, principles and structure of devolved government; or 
(j) the provisions of this Chapter. 
From the foregoing we could say that devolution of security functions is a matter which would 
require a referendum process as it relates to matters listed in Article 255. Given the logistics of 
a referendum, the country is not ready for such a huge milestone. Besides, there are other 
measures, discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, which can be taken in the meantime and still include 
both the national and county organs in security provision activities.   
  
                                                          




CHAPTER FOUR  
4.0 COMPARATIVE STUDY AND ANALYSIS  
Generally, due to globalisation, it may seem that there has been a trend such that countries are 
leaning more towards decentralisation of functions. Before globalisation, countries were 
generally governed by national governments and not by the regional ones introduced by the 
devolution regime. There has been a movement in most states such that resources, functions, 
powers, authority etc. have been transferred to the lower levels of government. This trend 
which has led to widespread decentralization has been encouraged by factors such as 
subnational lawfulness and respect for the rule of law – which was earlier discussed in Chapter 
3. It is through devolution that transfers of powers and resources, among other things, have 
been effected. In addition, decentralization has been viewed as a way in which regions are able 
to protect their historic, linguistic, religious and/or cultural roots. This however does not 
negatively affect inclusiveness of all. It mostly ensure protection of those communities 
considered to be marginalized.80  
Below, I will discuss two main countries which may be jurisdictions of best practice. I will 
give a brief background of what the problem was, what they did to deal with it - legal or policy 
wise - and an assessment of whether it has worked or not.  
Then I will look at what we can borrow from the set of case studies and why and what would 
not be beneficial to the Kenyan situation.  
 
4.1 DIFFERING FORMS OF DEVOLUTION  
A. Scotland  
Scotland was born after the United Kingdom was devolved to Northern Ireland, Wales and 
itself (Scotland). The two bodies now mandated with decision making functions are the 
Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. The range of decisions made in these 
aforementioned bodies include those in the realm of Health; Policing; Justice; Prisons & 
Education. Devolution was viewed as a mechanism to ensure that needs which were specific 
to the Scottish people were effectively addressed. At the same time, there are reserved matters. 
This means that, there are various sectors that are catered for only by the UK Government and 
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UK Parliament. Some of them include: Benefits and Social Security; Foreign Policy matters; 
Immigration; Trade and Industry; Defence and National Security etc.81 
We will now look at how policing functions in Scotland are organised at the national and local 
levels and how this may have led to any changes in the country’s policing sector.  
Policing in Scotland is effected in relation to four crucial challenges, which are: Crime and 
Disorder; Operational Policing in the Community; The Relationship between Crime and Drugs; 
and Dealing with the Young People and Youth Crime.82 The organisation of Scottish policing 
involves several bodies. Some of these institutions include: The Scottish Police College; the 
Scottish Criminal Record Office; Sottish Drug Enforcement Agency; and the Scottish Police 
Information Strategy. These aforementioned bodies mainly provide technical, training and 
scientific assistance to Scottish forces.83 Other forces include Tayside Police, Constabulary and 
Central Scotland Police. They have a main responsibility of protecting those residing in various 
places in Scotland.84  
Scotland has an organised crime strategy85 which ensures that the security agencies work 
together to share intelligence and deal effectively with criminals.  
As stated earlier, there are other functions which are only carried out by the UK Government 
– for example, counter terrorism activities. The reason why the policing functions are devolved 
to other bodies is so as to recognize benefits from the working together of members of the 
public, communities and professionals. The Scottish Government recognises the importance of 
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the cooperation so as to promote elasticity.86 This argument advances the need to have an 
intergovernmental system of government.  
A good example of how communities and members of the public have been involved in 
policing in Scotland is how the police forces are now employing civilian staff. Previously, 
civilians would only occupy minor roles such as administrative and clerical jobs, however, 
there have been changes. Professionally trained civilians are now occupying key roles which 
would only previously be occupied by police officers.87 The reason for the use of civilian staff 
in policing was credited to the search for ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ and also so that there 
could be ‘value for money’.88 This function carried out by the civilian population in Scotland 
could be related to the community policing initiative carried out in Kenya. The only difference 
being that, those involved in this activity in Scotland are skilled.  
With this organisation discussed above, there has been a general decrease in crime rates over 
time experienced in Scotland.89 Some of the statistics are presented in the table below:  
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However, it should be noted that the statistics have been tabulated based on the crimes that 
have been reported to the police forces.90 
 
B. South Africa  
In South Africa, functions are assigned through an intergovernmental system. This means that, 
there are three bodies which work together – these are, the local, provincial and national spheres 
of government. With this arrangement, the law provides that certain functions are strictly 
carried out by one sphere whilst other functions can be carried out by all spheres working 
together.91 
Prior to the democratic elections held in 1994 in South Africa, the police functions, like many 
other functions in South Africa, were mainly carried out under the apartheid rule. This means 
that, it was highly authoritarian and centralised. At that point in time, this was advantageous to 
the body that was in power because it helped the government keep the police in check as all 
the bodies would report to a central organ and it would be easier to control them. However, it 
was actually not an effective way of providing security since due to all that control, it was 
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CRIME  COMPARABLE RATES 
Crime, Disorder and Danger 
- Domestic Abuse  
- Racist Incidents  
- Crime Victimisation  
- Fire incidents   
The risk dropped from 25% in 
1992 to 14.5% in 2015/16.  
Violent Crimes  
- Homicide  
- Crimes involving 
firearms.  
The number of crimes 
reported in 2006/07 were 120 
which have dropped to 58 in 




reported that crime prevention activities were never carried out in areas which were considered 
populated by black people.92 
 
In South Africa, all law enforcement bodies charged with the task of maintaining the security 
and safety of the citizens are under the Department of Police. This body is responsible for 
ensuring that policies relating to security tasks are made, it gives direction to the law 
enforcement bodies and ensures that there is execution of functions as provided for by the law. 
This Department of Police is headed by the National Police Commissioner who is answerable 
to the Minister for Security.93 The bodies that are under this department include: the Civilian 
Secretariat for Police; the Independent Police Investigative Directorate; South African Police 
Service (SAPS); and the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority. SAPS is the principal 
body in charge of law enforcement in the country.94  
Some of the main functions of SAPS as provided for under Section 205 of the South African 
Constitution include:  
 To prevent, combat and investigate criminal offences  
 To maintain law and order 
 To ensure that the law is upheld and enforced  
 To protect and guarantee the security of all South Africans, including their 
property.  
 
In relation to the intergovernmental relations, it would be necessary to point out that the 
Constitution requires that the national and provincial governments work together in security 
matters. The law provides that before policies are put in place, there needs to be consultation 
between the national government and the respective provincial governments.95 Besides the 
policy making role that provincial governments had, they were also tasked with the following 
duties96, among others:  
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 To monitor the conduct of the police in the provinces  
 To oversee and report the effectiveness and efficiency of the SAPS in the respective 
provinces 
 To ensure and promote a good relationship between the police and the community  
 To pass laws relating to various policing functions.  
 
The inclusion of other arms of the government other than the national sphere only was due to 
the government’s agenda to mobilise the community as a whole to participate in the nation’s 
security and safety matters. The government decentralised powers as it saw the need to respect 
regional diversity and accommodate all diverse interests.97 The South African government has 
established civilian bodies which are in charge of oversight. Kenya also has a body which 
carries out the same function. This is the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA). 
Besides that, there are channels which have been established to ensure community participation 
– for example, there are public provincial hearings; during the policy making process, there are 
consultation exercises carried out in the different provinces; the various hearings are also 
publicly conducted etc.98 It is important to note however, that as much powers and functions 
are decentralised, the provinces still have difficulties in trying to access financial resources 
which would help them carry out these functions which have been assigned to them; which 
eventually makes it difficult for them to effectively carry out their tasks. This is a major 
challenge facing provinces in South Africa.99 
 
A look at the statistics below100 in some of the major crimes may help to determine whether 
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Category 2015 2016 Change 
Robbery of cash in transit 119 137 +15.1% 
Carjacking 12 773 14 602 +14.3% 
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs 68 561 76 159 +11.1% 
Murder 17 805 18 673 +4.9% 
Attempted murder 17 537 18 127 +3.4% 
Commercial crime 67 830 69 917 +3.1% 
Robbery at non-residential premises 19 170 19 698 +2.8% 
Robbery with aggravating circumstances 129 045 132 527 +2.7% 
Robbery at residential premises 20 281 20 820 +2.7% 
Common assault 161 486 164 958 +2.2% 
Burglary at non-residential premises 74 358 75 008 +0.9% 
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily 
harm 
182 556 182 933 +0.2% 
Malicious injury to property 120 662 119 901 -0.6% 
Stock-theft 24 965 24 715 -1.0% 
Burglary at residential premises 253 716 250 606 -1.2% 
Common robbery 54 927 54 110 -1.5% 
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition 15 116 14 772 -2.3% 
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle 55 090 53 809 -2.3% 
Drug-related crime 266 902 259 165 -2.9% 
Sexual Offences 53 617 51 895 -3.2% 




Theft out of or from motor vehicle 145 358 139 386 -4.1% 
Arson 5 127 4 903 -4.4% 
All theft not mentioned elsewhere 360 541 340 372 -5.6% 
Truck hijacking 1 279 1 184 -7.4% 
Sexual offences discovered as result of police 
action 
6 340 5 830 -8.0% 
Bank robbery 17 6 -64.7% 
 
The statistics relate to the time between March 2015 and March 2016. And it can be seen that 
while the rate in come crimes has decreased, others have considerably increased as well. At the 
same time, it is important to note that crime rates vary between one province and another 
depending on various factors.101  
 
4.2 APPLICATION TO KENYA  
To begin with, it is important to note that even with the examples above of the countries of best 
practice, from the statistics presented, even though there is devolution of security and policing 
functions, the effect has not had a substantial positive effect on the insecurity challenge.  
 
Security is a public good which should be provided to all within a country. This is so because, 
financial resources used for the provision of security are publicly drawn. However, it is 
important to note that for the central government to be able to have a national budget directed 
towards security activities, the national government relies heavily on some of the resources 
acquired from the counties.102 This means that, the state cannot work on its own because these 
resources are eventually acquired from each of the 47 counties. It needs a coordination 
mechanism.  
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At the same time, county jurisdictions cannot work on their own. Security is an issue which 
cuts across the county borders. This means, that, security threats emanate both internally and 
externally and therefore, the national security organs are the bodies that are most times well 
equipped to handle such matters and given the mandate to handle such issues.103 Therefore, 
even at the county level, with the current legal provisions, county Governors are not capable 
of operationalizing security operations without seeking the mandate of the National Security 
Council which is currently chaired by the President.  
 
These two issues clearly show the importance of having both levels of government working 
together.  
 
At the moment, the National Police Service (NPS) has already been restructured so as to portray 
the devolved system of government as exists in other sectors. Those formerly known as 
provincial police officers are now deployed as Regional Police Coordinators (RPC). There has 
been the establishment of County Commanders and beneath them are the Officers 
Commanding the Police Division (OCPD), the Officers Commanding the Station (OCS) and 
the service men and women.104  
 
There still exists a National Security Council (NSC), headed by the President. It is charged 
with two main duties. Those are: ensure that policies are implemented and also report to 
Parliament on the state of security in the country.105  
 
There is also a National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) whose main duty is to advise 
the NSC on security matters. Currently, all levels, including the counties have such regional 
bodies which report to the NSAC. Such information is what enables the NSAC make important 
decisions and advise the NSC.106  
 
What was previously known as the Provincial Administration (PA) is now what is referred to 
as the National Government Administration Office (NGAO). It has been charged with the 
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following functions: organization of national security policies; chairing County Security 
Committee’s; coordination of disaster rescue missions at the county level.107  
 
From the above therefore, it would seem that the county level of government has already been 
included in the policing and security functions and total devolution would be unachievable – 
due to other reasons highlighted below.  
 
Before mentioning the challenges which would be encountered in having complete devolution, 
below are some of the issues that need to be addressed in light of the bodies that have been 
established by the current devolution structure. They include:   
1. There has been a noticeable lack of understanding in carrying out of functions and who 
to report to between the Kenya Police and the Administration Police (AP) and the 
Regional Police Coordinators (RPC) and the County Police Commanders (CPC). There 
is misunderstanding as to rank as some CPC’s are at the same rank as RPC’s. In 
addition, there is lack of communication as to who the bodies are to report to.  
2. The law requires that there be County Police Authority (CPA) organs in all counties 
which act as advisors to the County Security Committee (CSC). However, there is no 
framework stating how the security structures at the lower levels should exchange 
information and collaborate. The functions of the County Commissioner and the 
County Police Commander should be clearly delineated.108  
 
Therefore, in light of the discussion above, the proposed devolved structure of the police and 
security sector would be an intergovernmental system – that is, the national and county levels 
of government should work together. Due to the sensitive nature of security, the National 
Security Council should continue to be headed by the President.  
 
Immediately under the President should be the Cabinet Secretary working closely with the 
Inspector General of Police (IG). Therefore, all police actors across the sector should be 
answerable to these two state offices. Then, all other bodies should carry out their functions as 
required.  
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In terms of enacting laws, there should be more involvement of the county level of government. 
There should be consultation and a clear method of disseminating information between the 
county level of government and the national government before laws are enacted – to ensure 
that they are efficient and actually solve the problems of insecurity in the counties. Perhaps at 
this level, the national government could work with the County Security Committees (CSC) so 
as to get information which would assist in the making of laws. In addition to providing 
information on the above, this body should also be the one charged with the mandate of 
monitoring the conduct of the community members. This will enable the national government 
to be more effective in dealing with the more serious external threats. The whole structure 
would therefore resemble a division of labour and specialisation model. This would therefore 
be a legislative and administrative form of devolution – not just the administrative form. This 
distinction was made in Chapter 1.  
 
Within the county level also, there should be a clear delineation of functions and a clear 
structure showing how the various bodies should collaborate. In addition to this, in as much as 
the County Police Authority is the body charged with the duty of finances in policing, in the 
county, there should be a financial oversight structure and other oversight bodies set up to 
ensure that finances and other resources are well managed by those put in charge of them. 
 
The county security bodies already set up should also be charged with the duty of strengthening 
the community policing initiative which has already been set up.  
 
As previously stated, a complete devolution of security and policing functions would lead to a 
“chaotic” transition. This is because:  
 There are serious challenges relating to how human resources will be acquired to fill in 
the gaps in terms of staff members required by the various counties.109 With the county 
government asking for more ranks to be put in place, there is still a gap in skilled and 
knowledgeable service men and women to fill these positions.  
 Another problem is that of transfer of financial and other resources required as 
machinery by the various counties. The national government may fail to adequately 
allocate these resources to each of the counties especially due to the increase in the rate 
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of corruption. This may lead to feelings of discrimination among those counties which 
may be looked down upon, in terms of financial contribution.110  
 There is also a lack of institutional capacity. That means, there are no bodies set up yet 
to deal with issues of oversight. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, when power is put 
in the hands of a few elites, some may amass the resources for themselves. Therefore, 
there should be accountability mechanisms in place to keep all in check.111  
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5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This study was carried out with the intention of establishing first, whether the current situation 
in the country will allow for complete devolution of security functions and if such an action 
will be the most suitable means of solving the insecurity problem in the country.  
 
5.2 FINDINGS  
 Even though security and policing functions are a mandate placed under the national 
government, the county levels of government are still charged with duties which could 
considerably shape the security sector of the country if they are diligently performed.  
 
 Complete devolution of the security and policing sector could lead to budgetary 
challenges. In 2014, the Office of the Controller of Budgets issued a report to the Senate 
which showed that counties lack the capacity to draw up budgets and even with the 
budgets drawn up, most of them had serious discrepancies and would therefore not be 
able to meet the set targets. Moreover, there is a general lack of inflow of finances into 
counties. Lack of finances would prevent the security organs from efficiently carrying 
out their mandates.  
 
 At the moment there is lack of skilled manpower to fill in the positions which would be 
established by a devolved system of government in the security sector. Due to its 
sensitive nature, security should only be left to those with the relevant knowledge and 
skills.  
 
 The legal implications of complete devolution may also be challenging. It may be 
difficult to harmonize the security laws of all the different counties and be impractical 
to have laws governing each county separately. This could eventually cause confusion 






5.3 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The purpose of the dissertation was to investigate whether or not devolution of security 
functions is possible in Kenya – with consideration of other factors – and if it is a plausible 
means of dealing with the problem of insecurity facing the country.  
 
Chapter 1 looked at the background of the problem where I mentioned some of the most tragic 
incidences of insecurity experienced in the country which eventually led to this debate. One of 
the examples mentioned is the post-election violence witnessed in the country in 2008. Also 
mentioned in this chapter are some of the proponents of the social contract theory which is 
considered the theoretical framework in line with the centralization of functions and resources. 
Also, the concept of devolution was explained and where it originated from and the custodians 
of security even in our country in relation to the Constitution of Kenya. Chapter 2 was more of 
a section which explained the historical background of the police force from the colonial era 
all the way to the kind of administration that is in place now.  
 
Chapter 3 and 4 mostly addressed the sufficiency of devolving security functions. There was a 
look at some of the efficiencies and deficiencies of having the devolved system in the policing 
and security functions outweighed against each other while chapter 4 looked at two countries 
considered those of best practice.  
 
Therefore, in conclusion, under the current Constitutional regime, security functions are placed 
under the national government. Legally, the only way this can be changed is if there is an 
amendment which goes through the referendum process. However, as already discussed above, 
complete devolution of the security sector would not be a practical solution after considering 
all other elements. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the county level of government is 
completely unable to participate in ensuring security. Chapter 4 clearly outlines the different 
ways the county level of government is involved and also shows measures which can be put in 
place to streamline the system.  
 
Community Policing, which is already in place, should be strengthened in all counties. Local 
approaches to some of the local problems, for example petty thefts, should be adopted as this 
will also lead to more cooperation between the police and the members of the community. It is 




particular community. This will also encourage the local community to acquire resources 
locally to help them promote community policing 
 
Secondly, it would be more reasonable for the government to look into the actual problems 
facing the police force. Having the national government being incharge of security functions 
and policing enables the country enjoy the advantages of economies of scale – this was 
explained in detail in Chapter 3. Therefore, there should be a move towards having institutions 
which can provide oversight functions so that vices within the force are dealt with. So instead 
of creating more problems which would be experienced in the transitional process, if complete 
devolution is to be carried out, inadequacies in the current force are what should be solved. The 
national arm of the government should work towards improving the police force. Currently, 
bodies such as the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA), the National Policing 
Commission (NPC), and other bodies established by the National Police Service Act (NPS) 
should lead investigations and highlight the undesirable matters that are facing the body so that 
they are addressed and dealt with.  
 
The country lacks the capacity to devolve the security functions especially because of the 
current state of resources in the country. Some counties may experience marginalization if the 
county committee is unable to adequately offer equal security protection for all – which is very 
possible as some counties have more resources than others; for example, Nairobi may be more 
secure than Garissa County because it is able to fund itself and acquire machinery which 
inhabitants in Garissa may not be able to have.  
 
Partial devolution can still ensure security for all so long as all stakeholders are actively 
involved and carry out their functions diligently with the aim of ensuring that it benefits all 
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